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Newtonianism and the physics of  





This paper is about two things that cross paths. One is the many senses of 
the category ‘Newtonian,’ and their uses for exegesis. The other is the phys-
ics that Emilie du Châtelet grounded philosophically around 1740 in her 
book, Institutions de physique. I offer it as a tribute to Moti Feingold’s mag-
isterial work on how the century after Newton responded to his science. I 
begin with some context.    
Many have described Institutions as a work of Leibnizian foundations 
for Newtonian science. An inspiring image, no doubt, but is it accurate? I 
argue here that it is not: little physics in her book is really Newtonian. Most 
of her physics is from figures before Newton; and even when she includes 
his results, du Châtelet filters them through demonstrably un-Newtonian 
ideas. So, we must abandon the conventional wisdom about her science.1  
                                                
1 In the 20th century, the dominant view became that Institutions is concerned with “merg-
ing Leibnizianism and Newtonianism”; is a “marriage between Leibnizian metaphysics 
and Newtonian science”; is an “introduction to Newtonian physics” attesting du Châtelet’s 
conversion to “Leibnizian metaphysics”; mediates “between Leibniz and Newton”; is a 
landmark document in the “history of French Newtonianism” and yet “framed according 
to Leibnizian principles.” Allegedly it is a “fusion of Newton, Descartes, and Leibniz,” and 
it synthesizes “Newtonian physics” and “Leibnizian metaphysics.” So pervasive is it that it 
has seeped into the broader consciousness of Anglophone academia. A philosopher of 
modern physics: du Châtelet “was one of the first people to bring the Newtonian and 
Leibnizian traditions together.” This collective modern verdict echoes the book’s appro-
bateur, Henri de Pitot, who gave it his imprimatur in 1738. See, respectively, Wade (1959: 
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Though he was not the only author of theory then—Descartes, Leibniz, 
and Huygens were too—Newton’s science was especially successful and 
long-lived, to an extent that no early modern could match. As a result, the 
attribute ‘Newtonian’ has come to denote aspects and areas of science that 
go well beyond what Isaac Newton, the historical figure, taught or implied. 
For that reason, the historian must handle the term ‘Newtonian’ with cau-
tion and good sense. Its polysemic nature can easily ruin an argument, if 
the label has not been carefully inspected first.  
I believe that sort of mishap has regrettably ruined most cases about du 
Châtelet’s physics being Newtonian. So, to prevent further error and wipe 
the slate clean for future research, I untangle here the various senses of 
‘Newtonian science,’ and determine which ones, if any, best capture the 
physique of her Institutions. I argue that no proper senses apply to it. On 
that basis, I conclude that ‘Newtonian’ is not a useful category for her sci-
ence. Newton’s importance notwithstanding, we need a different, better at-
tribute for her physics.  
To make my case, I distinguish three semantic regimes for the term 
‘Newtonian science,’ viz. presentistic, contextual, and straddling senses. 
Next, I examine which of them apply to du Châtelet’s physics, and how 
useful they are. Thus, a plain way to put my conclusion is, there are some 
senses of ‘Newtonian’ that apply to Institutions, but they are trivial and hol-
low, so they do no real interpretive work. And, there are some useful senses 
of ‘Newtonian,’ but her physics does not qualify for them.  
 
1.   Presentistic senses 
From 1905 to about 1925, physics suffered very drastic changes that re-
placed most of its foundation wholesale. When modern science emerged 
from these upheavals, it referred to the one it had supplanted as “classical 
physics.” Scientists with an eye to history (and some historians of science 
                                                
46), Barber (1967: 221), Janik 1982, Walters 2001, Gireau Geneaux 2001, Hagengruber 
2011, Hutton 2004, Gauvin 2006, Moriarty 2006, and Weatherall 2015. 
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too) would often call classical physics by the onomastic term ‘Newtonian.’ 
So, when contemporary science calls a theory ‘Newtonian,’ it does so from 
a presentistic viewpoint: it takes itself to have overcome or corrected certain 
limitations in the physics that preceded it. 
However, physics counts as classical in many senses, depending on 
which of its parts our science replaced. And, using Newton’s name for clas-
sical science has several, distinct aims. Some meant to credit him as the 
true author, some merely to honor his work, some used it for lack of a 
better onomastic, and some spoke out of militancy or deficient scholarship. 
Thus, referring to classical physics as ‘Newtonian’ because of its lacunas 
really denotes many limitations. Four, in particular, which yield four senses 
relevant to my aim:  
  
i. Newtonian vs Minkowskian.  
ii. Newtonian vs relativistic.   
iii. Newtonian vs quantized.   
iv. Newtonian vs modern.  
 
Spelled out in brief, these senses denote distinct features, as follows. For 
Newtonian physics in sense (i), the metric and temporal properties of ob-
jects are borne by two ontologically distinct carriers, space and time. Min-
kowski in 1908 replaced this view by introducing a new entity, spacetime, 
qua single substratum for Special Relativity. A physics counts as Newto-
nian in sense (ii) if its kinematics is Galilean. Namely, it allows us to de-
scribe the same physical process from any frames that relate to each other 
by a Galilean transformation. In early-modern physics, that was known as 
the Parallelogram of Motions. Special Relativity replaced it with the Lo-
rentz transformation, a different rule for describing mechanical processes 
across frames. In sense (iii), physical theory is Newtonian if it assumes that 
interactions are ‘continuous,’ not quantized. I.e., momentum and energy 
transfers in a system can take any value compatible with the relevant laws. 
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Quantum mechanics denies this assumption, and so it counts as post-New-
tonian science.2 Sense (iv) is a vehicle for the view that all of mechanics is 
grounded in Newton’s Second Law, or the principle f=ma. Specifically, that 
for every mechanical setup treated by the theory, the Second Law is the 
dynamical principle used to derive the equation of motion for the setup at 
issue. That contrasts with post-1925 physics, broadly based in the Schrö-
dinger Equation, for quantum mechanics; and the Einstein Field Equation, 
for gravitation theory.  
Is it a good idea to use ‘Newtonian’ in any sense above for du Châtelet’s 
science? Answer: No—there are two problems with that.  
Senses (i) through (iii) are inadequate for it, because they are trivial and 
vacuous. These senses apply just as well to mechanics before Newton: they 
turn Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, Huygens and Leibniz into makers of 
Newtonian science, because they too relied on the classical assumptions (i) 
through (iii). Moreover, everyone before 1905 counts as Newtonian in these 
respects. Even Newton’s opponents, detractors, competitors and precur-
sors accepted the above classical assumptions without discussion. No one 
then dreamed of denying them, for they had nothing to replace them with. 
That makes the term wholly trivial, if used for anything before 1905; but a 
label too easy to apply can’t be the source of real understanding. Plus, the 
term fails to clarify what is specific about the science of Institutions: it is 
explanatorily empty, so it gives us no real insight into her science. To call 
her science ‘Newtonian’ in any of the senses above is as banal as saying that 
it was printed on paper.  
Lastly, when used in sense (iv), the term ‘Newtonian’ is honorific, not 
explanatory nor descriptive. It is meant as a tribute to one achievement (out 
of many) in physics before Schrödinger and Einstein. Because of that, it is 
dangerously misleading. It makes Newtonians out of theorists whose basic 
concepts and laws are wholly unlike Newton’s, and competed with his.  
                                                
2 For the classical assumption, the relevant laws are Conservation of Momentum and Con-
servation of Energy. In quantum theory, momentum and energy are transferred in discrete 
packets (multiples of the Planck constant, a finite quantity).  
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And so, if ‘Newtonian’ is used in sense (iv) above, the label is false. But, 
if we use a false label, we risk missing what is distinctive and important 
about her science. Why is it false? Historically, pre-1905 mechanics has 
some five different formulations, and Newton’s impressed-force version is 
just one of them. Others are due to Leibniz and to figures around du Châ-
telet’s time, like d’Alembert and Euler; yet others come from Lagrange, 
Hamilton and Jacobi, in the 19th century.  
These facts suggest an interim conclusion: an important strand of usage 
for the category ‘Newtonian’ is inadequate for explaining du Châtelet’s sci-
ence as it stood around 1740. I move now to another semantic regime for 
the label at issue.  
 
2.   Straddling senses 
Another semantic regime includes senses that straddle Newton’s age and 
21st-century science. In particular, some aspects of physics count as genu-
inely Newtonian because Newton discovered them, and gave them place of 
prominence in the Principia; but they also reach into our age, which thus 
regards them as his contribution. In effect, these aspects straddle early and 
late modernity, and retain the same content across three centuries of theory 
change. That semantic currency would give any interpretive category a 
good deal of value.  
Thus understood, an area of science is Newtonian when it relies on ei-
ther of these two assumptions: 
  
v.  gravity and inertia are distinct.  
vi.  all basic forces are central.  
 
Now for some explanation and evidence.  
Sense (v) is really two ideas. One is (1) the kinematic claim that gravi-
tation and inertia correspond to distinct phenomena, or patterns of motion. 
The other is (2) the dynamical claim that gravitation and inertia are distinct 
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causal properties of matter. Specifically, inertia is a ‘force’ or ‘endeavor’ to 
persist in a state—of uniform translation, or zero acceleration. Gravity is a 
genuine, distinct force; it is a species of vis impressa (the genus concept of 
mechanical agency in the Principia), and it causes non-uniform motion, viz. 
accelerated translation or some curved path. Einstein subverted Newton’s 
distinction: in his General Theory of Relativity (GTR), gravitation and in-
ertia are no longer distinct kinds of matter in motion.3  
Sense (vi) is the thesis that, at explanatorily basic, microscale levels, all 
physical forces are actions at a distance exerted on the line between point-
sized particles. Newton announced this view in Opticks:  
 
Have not the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces by which 
they act at a distance not only upon the Rays of Light … but also upon one another 
for producing a great part of the Phaenomena of Nature? (Newton 1730: 350) 
 
Admittedly, he did not endorse it as considered doctrine; he thought it was 
just more plausible than its competitors, and a promising heuristic.4 Still, 
Newton did give it qualified assent. Then Laplace and his school adopted 
this exclusive view of force, and credited it to Newton:  
 
in the final analysis, the phenomena of nature reduce to actions ad distans between 
molecules. The consideration of these actions must form the basis of the mathe-
matical theory of these phenomena. (Laplace 1898 [1809]: 295)  
 
Many modern philosophers have called this picture ‘Newtonian.’5   
                                                
3 Lehmkuhl 2014 explains how Einstein thought his GTR unifies gravitation and inertia.  
4 Newton had a high evidential standard, viz. “deduction from phenomena.” Not every-
thing he pondered or gave some assent to cleared this high threshold of confirmation. The 
picture of all forces being inter-particle actions does not; only gravity does. Neither does 
the discrete-atoms picture of matter suggested in Query 31 of Opticks (or anything from 
those Queries, for that matter).  
5 An entire group of figures in physics, from Laplace to Du Bois-Reymond, subscribed to 
this picture of matter, and associated it with Newton; for evidence and discussion, see Fox 
1974 and van Strien 2021. For a recent usage of ‘Newtonian,’ see Sebens 2015. 
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In regard to sense (v.1), du Châtelet’s physics does count as Newtonian, 
but trivially: everyone before Einstein thought, without exception, that in-
ertial motion and heavy fall are distinct kinds of motion—even Descartes, 
Leibniz, and Malebranche thought so, as did Gassendi. No wonder du 
Châtelet does too. Judged from sense (v.2), her physics does not count as 
Newtonian. This straddling sense regards gravitation as a genuine, irreduc-
ible force: an action at a distance, seated in bodies made of ‘crass’ matter. 
Du Châtelet rejected this premise, however. She regarded gravity as an as-
if, or pseudo-force. The kinematic patterns of motion that Newton ascribed 
to real gravity, she argued, are caused by ‘subtle’ matter—not bodies—
swirling in vortices around the earth, sun, and the planets. Institutions re-
gards orbiting, free fall and projectile motion as epiphenomena of ether ac-
tion by contact, not of a genuine force of body.6 So, she was an anti-New-
tonian.  
Before I move to check Institutions in regard to sense (vi), a note is in 
order. That sense is very broad in scope. It applies to forces in physics, not 
just in mechanics. Newton and his followers meant it to cover forces re-
sponsible for trans-mechanical effects too—capillary action, light refrac-
tion, heat flow, electric currents, magnetic phenomena; and even some 
chemical reactions—not just the motion of inert masses. At the same time, 
du Châtelet promised a foundation for physics, not just mechanics. So, it 
would be no small matter if the science she grounded counted as Newto-
nian in this comprehensive sense.  
Unfortunately, I don’t think it does. Here is a short argument: to count 
as Newtonian in sense (vi), forces must be exerted at a distance, between 
point-sized masses standing in well-defined, determinate metric relations 
to each other (viz. facts like relative distance, angle, and curvature). But, du 
                                                
6 This raises the interesting question whether she was a Cartesian on this count. I tend to 
doubt it. Leibniz and Wolff (whom she followed) also rejected empty space, which they 
filled with ethers and vortices, all while rejecting many of Descartes’ central doctrines. 
Moreover, du Châtelet did use to accept (Newtonian) empty space, until she read Leibniz’s 
and Wolff’s philosophical objections to it; cf. Gardiner Janik 1982, and also below (section 
3b) for more details. I thank the editors for pressing me on this matter.  
 8 
Châtelet denies these premises. First, she rejects all action at a distance, not 
just Newtonian gravity; her reasons against it are well documented (for ev-
idence and discussion, cf. Section 3). Second, it would be rash to credit 
Institutions with an ontology of point-masses bearing space relations. True, 
she did argue that perceptible bodies are grounded in unextended ‘elements.’ 
However, we have no evidence that she thought those elements carry mass, 
impressed force, and distance relations to each other. In her ontology, inter-
element relations are at best an early version of topological facts: they are 
relations of serial ordering (being next in a series), not metric properties.  
 
3.  Contextual senses 
In the contextual approach, we illuminate a historical work by the light that 
its age cast on it—to understand that work, we look at how they understood 
it. From this vantage point, interpretive categories come in two kinds, in-
ternal and external. Here I use ‘Newtonian’ as an internalist category that 
covers tenets, heuristics, theoretical foundations, and research programs 
that Newton himself endorsed, and then figures from 1700 to 1750 associ-
ated with him.7 These two kinds differ in their respective power to explain 
particular things, and require different types of evidence to establish their 
presence.  
Often, du Châtelet’s breakthrough in her Institutions is presented as the 
insight that mechanics needs a philosophical basis to be properly grounded. 
But Newton knew that too.8 Accordingly, his Principia came pre-equipped 
with conceptual foundations, which then acquired a life of their own. As a 
                                                
7 In contrast, externalist approaches to ‘Newtonian’ single out aspects like personal loyal-
ties, political allegiances, group self-identification, elements of material culture, or mem-
bership in networks of patronage, of professional advancement, and of the circulation of 
knowledge.  
8 I use the following abbreviation, followed by the section number in the work: I = Insti-
tutions de physique ([du Châtelet] 1740); C = Cosmologia generalis (Wolff 1737); E = Ele-
menta matheseos universae (Wolff 1733). Unless otherwise noted, all translations and em-
phases are mine. I cite Newton from the second edition of the Principia (Newton 1713), 
abbreviated as ‘P2,’ followed by page number; Newton 1999 is the best English translation.  
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result, by 1740 mechanical theory counted as Newtonian if it was based in 
one or more of these grounding assumptions. 
 
vii.  Physics requires absolute space and time. 
viii.  Mechanics is a theory of impressed forces.   
ix.   Gravity is a universal action at a distance.  
x.   Mechanics rests on ‘hard bodies.’  
 
Let us assess Institutions from these standpoints on Newtonian science.  
Kinematic foundations.  In exact terms, sense (vii) asserts that abso-
lute space and time are indispensable kinematic foundations, qua the fun-
damental frame and chronometer, respectively. Namely, a force-free body 
moves uniformly straight ahead primarily in respect to absolute space—
and, relative to a material frame, only because of this fact. Second, an iner-
tial clock keeps true time just in case it takes equal stretches of absolute 
time for it to mark equal intervals. In a Scholium to his Definitions, Newton 
gave five arguments that his laws apply primarily to motions in absolute 
space. His Corollary V then proved that the laws also hold true—but deriv-
atively, as a physical consequence of the Third Law—in any material frame 
at rest or in uniform translation relative to absolute space.9  
It is unclear how closely du Châtelet had considered his inference. To 
refute “space distinct from matter,” first she brings up Leibniz’s point, con-
tra Clarke, that absolute space allows Leibniz-shifts that would reduce God 
to choosing without a sufficient reason, which “is absurd” (I 73, 75). Then 
she rehearses Wolff’s genetic account of our notion of space—by “abstrac-
tion,” from considering “things existing outside each other”—to claim that 
space is just the intentional object of a mental representation common to us 
all. She infers, “it is certain that no space exists except insofar as there are 
real coexisting Beings; and without these things there would be no Space,” 
which “does not subsist beyond things” (I 77, 79, 87). Then she makes a 
                                                
9 The argument is in P2: 5-11; Newton 1999: 408-14.  
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parallel argument against absolute time, and concludes, “Time in reality is 
nothing but the order of successive Beings… So, no Time exists without real 
successive Beings ordered in a continuous series” (I 102).    
And, du Châtelet is explicit about the targets of her attack: Newton, and 
also Locke, Clarke, Raphson, and Keill, whose Introductio ad veram physi-
cam had riled Wolff greatly. Thus, in respect to kinematic foundations she 
counts as anti-Newtonian; which disproves the received view.10     
Dynamical laws.  Spelled out precisely, sense (viii) is the view that 
mechanics is the science of motions caused by vis impressa, the type of 
force governed by Newton’s three laws, not just anything. The First Law, 
of inertia, specifies how a body behaves in the absence of impressed force. 
The Second codifies its nature and strength: impressed force is an action, 
and equals the “change in motion” of the body on which it acts. The Third 
fixes relations between impressed forces: they are interactions, viz. come in 
pairs, are equal and opposite, and act on different bodies. Newton had made 
the Law of Inertia into his first law of motion, and Institutions seems to 
follow suit. However, just stating the Law is no proof of Newtonianism, 
because the principle precedes Newton by five decades. It would make du 
Châtelet a Newtonian if she meant it as he does. But, she does not. For one, 
she does not claim—as she should, were she a Newtonian—that only im-
pressed forces can change a body’s inertial state. For another, she followed 
Christian Wolff in his denial of absolute space; which cuts her off from this 
brand of Newtonianism. In the Principia, inertial rest and uniform transla-
tion are defined in respect to absolute space, the preferred frame for the 
true motions of bodies. Du Châtelet won’t endorse that thought, but offers 
no alternative to it. So, it is unclear, from Institutions, relative to what a 
force-free body stays at rest or moves inertially. Not only is her first law of 
motion not a Newtonian principle, but also it appears empirically empty.11    
                                                
10 Wolff to his confidant, Count Manteuffel, 7 June 1741: “If you read what she says on 
space [in Chapter V], you will find that she speaks there no differently than I used to do, 
in my classroom lectures” (Ostertag 1910: 41).  
11 In her book, the Law of Inertia is a claim about bodies having a ‘passive force’ of resist-
ing; it is not (as Newton had it) a principle about endeavoring to remain in the same state 
 11 
Still, one law in Institutions seems Newtonian beyond doubt: “the reac-
tion is always equal to the action” (I 259). Surely this must be her statement 
of Newton’s famous Third Law? And yet, I argue, this appearance deceives 
badly. Du Châtelet’s principle is ultimately Leibnizian, and strictly incom-
patible with Newton’s science. Her former allegiance to Newton, abjured 
once she discovered Wolff’s philosophy, survives as an afterthought to her 
account of action and reaction. To prove my claim, I begin by showing the 
true genealogy of du Châtelet’s law. It is not the Principia. Rather, it comes 
from Phoronomia, an influential 1716 treatise on mechanics by Jakob Her-
mann, a Swiss protégé of Leibniz. Take her twin claims that a body’s force 
of inertia is the cause of its reaction; and that any interaction is a conflict of 
forces between a body that acts and one that resists: 
 
This resistance—which all Bodies put up when one tries to change their present 
state—is the foundation of the third Law of motion, according to which the reac-
tion is always equal to the action…. Bodies resist by their force of inertia, and in 
reacting they tend to change the state of the Body that pushes them…. In every 
action, the Body that acts and the one against which it acts struggle with each 
other, and without this sort of struggle [lutte] there can be no action. For, I ask, 
how can a force act against that which opposes no resistance to it? (I 259; my 
emphasis) 
 
Consider now its source in Phoronomia:  
 
In this force of inertia of matter is grounded the law of Nature whereby to every 
action there is an equal and opposite reaction. For in every action there is a strug-
gle [luctatio] between an agent body and a patient one, and without such struggle 
no action, properly so called, of the agent upon the patient can be conceived…. 
Hence in all corporeal action there is a clash between an agent force and the re-
sistance of the patient body, an application of the agent’s force onto the body 
receiving the action; that is. (Hermann 1716: 3, 378).  
 
                                                
of motion. And, because she does not say relative to what material frames her Law holds, 
we cannot determine what empirical facts might make it true.  
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Now take her explanation that action consists in the spending of active force 
by the agent, or acting body. She phrases it as her answer to a supposed 
objection: if action equals reaction (e.g. when I pull on a body) they must 
balance each other. Then only rest, not motion, can result from them.  
 
Those who raise this objection fail to grasp that when I pull on this Body and I 
make it move, I do not use all my force to defeat its resistance. Rather, when I 
have defeated it, I have some force left over, which I use so as to proceed; and the 
Body proceeds by the force that I communicated to it. Hence, although the two 
forces are unequal, action and reaction are always equal. (I 259) 
 
Consider, again, its source in Phoronomia:   
 
The force of a body is not the action itself. For, action is just the application of 
some force onto a subject capable of receiving it, or to which force can be applied. 
Hence, we must hold that the said force is applied to that body which resists, 
withstands, reacts.… Therefore, as we say that any action is equal and contrary to 
the reaction of the patient body, all we mean is: in all corporeal action, as much 
of the agent’s forces is lost as it is gained by the body receiving the action. Action 
itself is equal and contrary to the resistance of the patient, which is its reaction, 
because this resistance—this force of inertia—by the patient body must be re-
moved first, so that the patient might be set in motion by the agent (Hermann 
1716: 378f.)  
 
This view of action and reaction goes back to Leibniz, who had endorsed 
Hermann’s account in a letter of 1715: “The inertia of matter that you dis-
cuss in § 11 is a wonderful topic, fit for the deepest research; few have 
grasped it so far.... [Without it] there is no reason why there would be a 
struggle between agent and patient [in impact]” (Gerhardt 1860: 398, my 
italics). Then sanctioned it in his anonymous review of Phoronomia: “Her-
mann notes that the rule ‘to every action there is an equal reaction’ follows 
from the inertia of  matter, first discovered by Kepler” ([Leibniz] 1716: 2). 
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Wolff knew it, and in his German Metaphysics he took over Hermann’s 
principle.12 That may be where du Châtelet first found it.  
Crucially, du Châtelet’s law of action and reaction is un-Newtonian in 
essence too, not just in genealogy, because her law is not a statement about 
impressed forces. She regards interaction as an asymmetric clash between 
an agent and a patient deploying heterogeneous mechanisms: the agent acts 
by spending part of its active force so as to defeat the patient, whereas the 
latter reacts by exerting a distinct, passive power to resist, or ‘force of iner-
tia.’ Moreover, because of her denial of action at a distance, du Châtelet 
restricts the law to contact interactions. And, due to her conversion to 
Wolffianism, her measure of action and reaction is unclear, and her distinc-
tion agent-patient is not well defined.13 In radical contrast, Newton thinks 
of interaction as a symmetric exercise of homogeneous powers: Newtonian 
reaction just is action, not different in kind from it; actions and reactions 
just are impressed forces, not different from them.14 His measure of both 
is the “change in motion” mutually induced by the interacting bodies, viz. 
two equal and opposite momentum increments. Newtonian mechanics nei-
ther supports nor needs a distinction between agent and patient. And, it 
allows direct action-reaction at a distance, which makes Newton’s Third 
Law vastly broader in scope than du Châtelet’s law.   
In conclusion, her laws of mechanics are not Newtonian principles, de-
spite their surface similarity with those. Her’s and Newton’s respective laws 
differ fundamentally in meaning, empirical measure, range of application, 
                                                
12 “As Professor Hermann has [explained], we must not take the force of a body to be the 
same as its action—as those who see a problem in our law of action and reaction do. For 
a body does not act on another with all the force that it has, rather only to the extent that 
the other body resists it. The action of a body A on B consists in that A breaks the resistance 
of B. Then, when B resists it no longer, A pushes it along without any effort, insofar as it 
lies in the way of its motion.”—Wolff 1720: §§ 669-71.  
13 Cf. Section 3b for thorough discussion, below.  
14 Newton defines impressed force as “the action exerted so as to change its state, whether 
of rest or moving uniformly straight ahead.” Then he explains, “this force consists in the 
action alone, and does not remain in the body after the action. For, a body stays in any 
new state solely through the force if inertia” (P2: 2, my italics).   
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and explanatory payoff. Hence this part of the received view about Newto-
nianism in her treatise collapses as well.   
Action at a distance.  In sense (ix), science is Newtonian if it assumes 
that any two particles of matter act on each other by a force akin to terres-
trial gravity; and they exert it directly, without any material intermediary, 
e.g. some subtle medium or ether. Is du Châtelet a Newtonian in the third 
sense above? To decide if she is, we must turn to Chapter 16 of Institutions, 
entitled ‘On the Newtonian attraction.’ It examines the view that gravity is 
a universal actio in distans, and that some phenomena—capillarity, some 
chemical processes, and optical refraction—are explainable as phenome-
nological effects of real action-at-a-distance forces. Namely, long-range in 
the case of gravitation, and short-range for the remaining cases. Du Châ-
telet does not even try to present the argument for universal gravity in Book 
III of Principia, let alone his most important result, viz. the proof that grav-
ity is a central force, proportional to the mass of the interacting bodies di-
vided by the square of their distance (P2 362-72). She just reviews a set of 
theses, which are Newtonian in asserting the existence of various real ac-
tion-at-a-distance forces, including gravity.15  
Decisively, du Châtelet introduces these theses only to reject them as 
false explanations. She attacks them twice, by the same strategy. Specifi-
cally, she argues that genuine action at a distance violates the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, PSR, a fundamental metaphysical constraint. “This prin-
ciple of sufficient reason ... which is impossible to give up, destroys that 
magical Palace erected on attraction” (I 395). Suppose two bodies A and B 
to be separated by a finite distance. Without contact action (by an interven-
ing material medium), she claims, “there is no sufficient reason” why B 
should accelerate toward A. Also, there must be a sufficient reason why A 
would accelerate B (from a distance) in this direction rather than that, and 
                                                
15 Many of the results she presents are not due to Newton but to self-professed disciples: 
John Keill and John Freind in Britain, and her friend in France, Maupertuis. These results 
do not come from the Principia, are not derived by Newton’s method there, and are not 
even natural extensions of his theory by means of the Second Law. Keill, Freind and Mau-
pertuis were Newtonians in the senses (viii) and (ix) above.  
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by this amount rather than that. But, there is none, she contends. Ergo, 
attraction is merely apparent, not real. That is, apparent accelerations be-
tween distant bodies are just that—the illusion of action at a distance. In 
reality, they are effects of contact action, be it a vortex of subtle matter or 
impact by unobservable particles. In her words, the PSR entails that “these 
effects must be produced by mechanical causes,” and so “the English” stand 
refuted. Ergo, “the supposition that all matter is heavy”—viz. gravitates to-
ward any other piece of matter—“is entirely false.” For, “by the principle 
of sufficient reason,” heaviness is an “effect of impact by a surrounding mat-
ter that is not itself heavy” (I 399, 76).     
Du Châtelet adopts here Wolff’s case in Cosmologia. A fierce opponent 
of ‘Newtonian’ action-at-a-distance generally, and of universal gravity in 
particular, Wolff had argued that  
 
No change can be induced in a body except by another body contiguous to it. 
A body does not act on another unless it presses against it [in ipsum impingit]. For 
a body A to act on another B, it is necessary that there be a reason why it acts on 
it rather than not. Because a body always acts by means of its active force, hence 
only if it is in motion: it is evident that there is no reason why A should act on B 
as long as A moves freely and there is nothing to obstruct its motion. 
Action at a distance is impossible. … Suppose—if it were possible—that body A 
acts at a distance. Let it act on B placed at some interval from it, say 20 feet. And, 
suppose it produces in B a motion. … From the fact that A persists in its given 
place and is endowed with active force, we do not understand at all [minime intel-
ligitur] why B, which sits away from A, must move. … Consequently, B’s motion 
lacks a sufficient reason, hence is sheer accident [casus purus], which is impossible 
(by §§ 56, 94-5 of my Ontologia). So, action at a distance is impossible. (C 128, 
320, 322; his italics)  
 
As early as 1709 Wolff had engaged in sharp polemics with Keill and 
Freind, the two defenders of ‘attraction’ that du Châtelet too chastises in 
Chapter 16.16 Whatever her early opinions on distant action might have 
been, by 1739 she had come to believe that it could not be real. The cause 
                                                
16 Their polemic exchanges are briefly surveyed in Thackray 1970: 58ff.  
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was Wolff’s teaching, as he boasted in 1740: “She had previously accepted 
the Newtonian attractions as true, whereas now she grants that one cannot 
admit them as anything but a phaenomenon.” And also: “the Marquise de-
clares herself ready to burn all her received opinions at the altar of my 
doctrine—as she has already done with the Newtonian attraction,” i.e. uni-
versal gravity (Droysen 1909: 229). In conclusion Chapter 16, far from be-
ing an endorsement of Newtonian science, is in fact a sharp rebuke of New-
ton. It is really the last salvo in Wolff’s thirty-year war against the Newto-
nians. 
To sum up, in the sense (ix) above du Châtelet is an anti-Newtonian, 
because she rejects both the key thesis of the Principia and its extension to 
chemistry and optics.17 In fact, the situation is even more severe. Du Châ-
telet’s two commitments—to the denial of real action at a distance; and to 
the Hermann-Wolff law of action and reaction, which is a principle of one-
way causation, not of mutual interaction—entails that she must reject as 
illegitimate most of the physical theory in Newton’s treatise, except for the 
important but rather narrow results in Sections 2 through 10 of Book I in 
Principia. Her two commitments above entail that Sections 11 through 
14—the remainder of Book I, where Newton treats interactions, perturba-
tion theory, and the gravitational potential of spheroids—are nothing but 
mathematical models with no physical import. In sum, du Châtelet’s ac-
ceptance of Wolffian dogma puts most of Newton’s science out of reach for 
her. The conventional wisdom on her physics looks untenable.   
Matter theory.  In the sense (x), science is Newtonian if it supposes 
that the preferred matter theory for mechanics is the ‘hard body’ and empty 
space. In modern terms: that macroscopic bodies are composed of rigid 
atoms interacting in vacuo through action-at-a-distance forces and contact 
forces. Newton in the Opticks had asserted that rigid atoms are the most 
                                                
17 Newman 2017 is the standard account of the reception of Newton’s particle-and-force 
chemistry in the early 18th-century.  
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plausible unit of matter: “all Bodies seem to be composed of hard Particles” 
(1730: 363). His followers in Britain endorsed this picture of matter.18  
Does du Châtelet count as a Newtonian in this sense? No, she does not. 
First, she rejected rigid atoms, the Newtonians’ preferred architecture of 
matter. She argues that atoms have shapes, and for atoms to be real, a suf-
ficient reason must exist for them having this rather than that particular, 
determinate shape. But, no such reason can be given: “if small atoms were 
swimming in a vacuum, their size and shape would be without a sufficient 
reason” (I 73). So, atoms are not real. Wolff had dismissed them by the 
same move: “An occult quality is that which lacks a sufficient reason why it 
inheres in its subject, or even why it can possibly inhere. The shape of  ma-
terial atoms is an occult quality” (C 189-90; his emphasis).  
In addition, du Châtelet also excluded empty space, which she thought 
physicists had adopted “on Mr. Newton’s authority.”  To subvert the “ab-
solute vacuum,” she deploys the argument from Leibniz-shifts, which she 
considers “unanswerable” (I 73, 75). Having rejected real actio in distans, 
she then claims that all apparent effects of distance action must be caused 
by a subtle medium acting by contact. Clearly this medium must pervade 
all space up to cosmic scales—so as to account for the appearance of celes-
tial attractions—hence du Châtelet’s world is a plenum in which vortices 
carry continuous, deformable, gross matter around: the “hypothesis of a 
vacuum is false, and there is no such empty space in Nature” (I 75-6). In 
content and intent, this is anti-Newtonian. 
In conclusion, there is nothing about the grounding principles of du 
Châtelet’s mechanics that we may call Newtonian legitimately and usefully. 
The standard view once again looks untenable.          
 
                                                
18 Newton had committed to void space already by the time of De Gravitatione, written no 
later than 1684. In Principia, he made a strong case that interplanetary space must be 
empty, not filled with the Cartesians’ ether vortices. There is some debate about whether 
Newton admitted real action at a distance; Henry 2011 persuaded me that he did. For his 
matter theory among his followers in Britain, see Heimann and McGuire 1971.     
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3b.  Newtonian mechanics: empirical theory 
There is yet another sense to ‘Newtonian science.’ This particular meaning 
is robust, illuminating, and far from trivial. It takes some detailed argument 
to establish its presence, so I have set it aside for special treatment here. It 
is as follows: 
 
xi. Originating in the Principia and explained as it does: from the no-
tion of impressed force, the basic concept in Newton’s dynamics.  
 
This sense of ‘Newtonian’ is powerfully explanatory, and would cast much 
needed light on her book. It would explain why each result is in there: be-
cause it follows from the basic notions. And, it would show the physics of 
Institutions to be a unified theory—built on a single, common basis—not a 
patchwork of juxtaposed doctrines. Then let us examine it more closely.  
To say that her science is Newtonian in this way is really a conjunction 
of two claims. First, that some of it comes directly from the Principia as 
Newton had treated it there. Second, that whatever in her book is not from 
Newton is an extension of his theory by means of the Second Law, his gen-
eral principle. I postpone the first claim for later. Is the second true? By the 
time Institutions came out, there had been just two extensions of the Second 
Law to novel setups beyond the Principia. One was a treatment of hard-
body impact, viz. the frontal collision of two translating rigid spheres, in a 
prize essay that du Châtelet must have read.19 The other was a 1736 paper 
on the collision of rotating bodies, which she could not have seen (Euler 
1744). But, there is no collision theory in Institutions, and thus no trace of 
these parts of Newtonian science properly so-called. As to other extensions 
of the Second Law—to fluid motion, rigid-body dynamics, elasticity and 
celestial mechanics—they are all subsequent to du Châtelet’s treatise, 
sometimes by decades.   
                                                
19 That was MacLaurin [1724] 1732, a paper published in the proceedings of the Paris 
Academy, which she followed closely.  
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And so, the last hope for the received view is to prove that du Châtelet’s 
science is Newtonian because her empirical results come directly from his 
book. I now examine the relevant chapters in Institutions, to see if they meet 
this criterion. However, first I must introduce a distinction between two 
types of acceleration in a region, or neighborhood: 
 
Laminar: the acceleration is equal and parallel, at every point. 
Central: it points to a single center, and varies with distance from it.  
  
The distinction seems trifling, but it does real work. Gravity-like effects and 
motion patterns (orbits, trajectories and configurations) had been studied 
before Newton. But, pre-Newtonian science had always supposed the ac-
celeration of gravity to be laminar. Newton innovated significantly, by sup-
posing it to be central as defined above (and then showing universal gravi-
tation to vary as the inverse-square distance from the center of force). This 
matters greatly for my case, to which I return.  
Chapter 11 is a kinematics of straight-line motion, uniform and accel-
erated. These results come from Galileo, not Newton. In Parts I and II of 
Day Three in his treatise, Two New Sciences, Galileo had quantified the re-
lations between speed, time, and distance for a body in uniform translation 
and free fall under laminar acceleration (Galilei 1638: 150-77). Soon after 
that his student, Torricelli, re-derived these relations in De motu gravium 
(1644: 97-126). Then Huygens reprised them in Part II of Horologium os-
cillatorium, his masterpiece (1673: 21-31). Admittedly, these figures show 
their results in terms of Eudoxean ratios (between homogeneous magni-
tudes) whereas du Châtelet gives them as algebraic expressions. That is be-
cause she took them from Christian Wolff’s Elementa matheseos, an inter-
national bestseller reissued throughout the 18th century.20 In sharp con-
                                                
20 Cf. E 1-110. Wolff cites Varignon as his precursor in the “analytic,” or algebraic, account 
of motion “in the Galilean hypothesis,” i.e. the assumption of laminar gravity (E 103).  
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trast, Newton’s theory of free fall is about bodies accelerated toward a cen-
ter, by a force varying as the distance to it (P2 105-11). It is not restricted 
to laminar acceleration, as Galileo-Huygens theory is. But, it is the latter 
that du Châtelet presents, so her Chapter 11 is not Newtonian science.  
Chapter 12 is an outline of “composite motion,” i.e. curvilinear trajec-
tories. First, du Châtelet presents a basic kinematic principle for it: the Par-
allelogram Rule for accelerations and forces. The principle is old. Applied 
to powers in static equilibrium, its mention and use goes back to Aristotle’s 
Hellenistic followers. Galileo had explained projectile motion as a “result-
ing composite motion” [motus quidam emerget compositus] from horizontal 
translation and laminar fall (1638: 237ff, 250). So had Huygens, who fol-
lowed him on this topic (1673: 21). Newton derived the Parallelogram Rule 
in the Principia, as Corollary I and II to his laws of motion, and applied it 
to planetary orbits to show that they obey Kepler’s second law (P2 13f., 
34ff). But Newton made clear that the Rule was not his discovery, and du 
Châtelet does not claim that either. Hence the Parallelogram Rule, and by 
extension Chapter 12, is not Newtonian science in the sense at issue.  
There follows a diptych of theory and confirmation. Chapter 13 outlines 
a theory of free fall and vertical ascent near the surface of the earth without 
air resistance. Du Châtelet adds to it some key relations between speed, 
distance, and time of fall. The theory is not Newtonian in any meaningful 
sense. For one, she has a Leibnizian conception of the cause of fall.21 More-
over, her quantitative relations come from Galileo, who first derived them 
in Two New Sciences (1638: 156-72). Critically, just like the rest of her sci-
ence, this particular theory too has a limitation that makes it essentially 
non-Newtonian: it is restricted to laminar gravity. The “cause that makes a 
body fall is supposed to act equally in every instant,” she declares (I 305, 
my italics). So, it does not vary with distance. The accompanying Chapter 
14 surveys the experimental evidence for Galileo’s theory of free fall—
again, not Newton’s science. If we trace the findings and experiments that 
                                                
21 It is Leibnizian because she adopts his view in Specimen dynamicum of ‘heaviness’ as a 
dual agency causing ‘dead force’ in constrained bodies and ‘live force’ in free ones. 
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she reviews, we find Riccioli and Grimaldi in the 1650s; Huygens and Mar-
iotte in the 1670s; and figures closer to her time, like Desaguliers, Frenicle 
de Bessy and Pitot, who refereed her Institutions. Newton finally makes an 
appearance, but just as a figure among many. She reports his pendulum 
experiments, but the conclusion she draws from them is ambiguous. For 
Newton himself, they were proof that a body’s amount of matter [copia 
materiae] is always proportional to its weight (P2 365f ).22 However, du 
Châtelet explains them as evidence that weight is proportional to bodies’ 
“amount of proper matter,” and also to their “mass” (I 323). But, she leaves 
the first term unexplained and the second undefined—so, it is unclear how 
they relate to each other, and whether she understands mass as Newton 
does, viz. qua measure of resistance to changes of state. What is clear is 
that her science in these two chapters is Galileo’s kinematics of free fall—
not Newton’s dynamics of gravity, in which the acceleration is central, not 
laminar (P2 105-14).  
Chapter 16 is a digression on metaphysical foundations, not empirical 
theory. I have discussed it above (in § 3), so I will not examine it further 
except to say that it is not genuinely Newtonian science.  
Chapter 17 presents a qualitative theory of constrained fall on an in-
clined plane (simple and compound) and an immovable surface. In two 
respects, these results are not Newtonian. First, they come from figures 
before Newton. Galileo devised the modern theory of the inclined plane, in 
Day Three of Two New Sciences (1638: 177-235). Building on an idea by 
Simon Stevin, Torricelli soon refined and extended Galileo’s theory (1644: 
127-53). Then Huygens in Horologium made it rigorous, then extended it 
to compound inclined planes and—by letting the planes shrink to infinites-
imal lengths—also to bodies falling on an immobile curve, viz. a cycloid 
(1673: 31-59). Second, these results suffer from a common limitation. 
Namely, they assume the acceleration of gravity is laminar. In contrast, 
Newton had treated constrained fall (on epicycloids and hypocycloids, in 
                                                
22 In modern terms, Newton produced experimental evidence that inertial mass is equal 
to passive gravitational mass.  
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Section 10 of Book I) under central accelerations varying as some distance 
to the force center, posita cuiuscunque generis Vi centripeta (P2 132-9). The 
sheer generality of Newton’s analysis turns the Galileo-Torricelli-Huygens 
results into special cases valid just in the limit case of the center of acceler-
ation being at infinity. But, Institutions takes up just these limit cases—yet 
without showing them to be special consequences of Newton’s gravity—
and so Chapter 17 is not Newtonian science.      
Chapter 18 outlines a theory of the simple pendulum, including two 
conditions for isochronism, and ends with a qualitative account of the com-
pound pendulum. This account comes from Huygens, not Newton. In Sec-
tions I and IV of Horologium, Huygens had presented mathematical treat-
ments of the mass-point and the compound pendulum, respectively. 23 
Again these results are un-Newtonian. The first theory lacks the generality 
of Newton’s treatment of isochronous oscillation (P2 139-47). And, the se-
cond is simply unobtainable from Newton’s principles. A fact often over-
looked is that some setups of classical mechanics cannot be treated from 
the dynamical laws given in the Principia (cf. Smith 2007). Huygens’ com-
pound pendulum, which du Châtelet takes over in Institutions, is one such 
setup, and so her Chapter 18 cannot possibly be Newtonian.   
Chapter 19 gives a theory of projectile motion without air resistance. It 
too comes from Galileo, who first treated the topic in Day Three of Two 
New Sciences. There he obtained the key results of du Châtelet’s chapter—
based on a striking proof that the projectile path is a semi-parabola, if the 
projection is horizontal (Galilei 1638: 237ff; I 507). Her Chapter 19 has the 
same drawback that makes it pre-Newtonian: it limits the account to mo-
tion in laminar gravity—as Galileo had done—instead of Newton’s motion 
under arbitrary central forces (cogente Vi quacunque centripeta, P2 114-20).    
                                                
23 The former, also known as the ‘simple’ or ‘mathematical’ pendulum, models the bob as 
a point mass attached to a weightless rod. The compound pendulum models the bob as an 
extended rigid body, attached to a flexible string. To treat the latter, Huygens had employed 
an energy principle—a claim about the total vis viva in the bob—not Newton’s laws of 
force, which cannot yield a solution.   
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Lastly, Chapter 20 is a doctrine of ‘dead’ forces. That is Leibniz’s coin-
age in Specimen dynamicum, where he distinguished it from ‘live’ force. Du 
Châtelet imports his terminology and concept, including his examples.24 
Again following Leibniz, her paradigm is the forces exerted by bodies in 
static equilibrium. In every conceivable respect, this chapter is not Newto-
nian science. Statics, the science of ‘dead’ forces, long precedes Newton; its 
key results come from Archimedes, the medieval ‘science of weights,’ and 
Stevin. And, du Châtelet’s two conditions for static equilibrium come from 
Torricelli and Varignon, who worked before Newton and outside the New-
tonian tradition, respectively. There is no statics in Principia, whether of 
‘dead’ forces or anything else.   
Chapter 21 is outside the scope of my topic here: it explains and defends 
vis viva—a Leibnizian idea irrelevant to her Newtonianism, except perhaps 
as evidence against it.    
The missing Newton.  Because Chapter 15 presents some of Newton’s 
results in the science of motion, I set it aside here for extended scrutiny. Du 
Châtelet’s ostensible topics in it are elliptical orbits under inverse-square 
accelerations directed to a fixed center; Newton’s ‘Moon test’ and theory of 
terrestrial gravity; and a digression on the Earth’s shape at the North Pole, 
which a 1736 French expedition to Lapland confirmed.25 These results do 
come from the Principia, though flattening at the poles is predicted in it, 
but not proved empirically. Still, that is not enough to justify calling them 
instances of Newtonian science. That is because the results presented are 
just kinematic: they are facts about accelerations, trajectories, and shapes. 
For them to be Newtonian, du Châtelet should have attached Newton’s 
causal mechanism for them, viz. universal gravity acting from particle to 
particle.  
                                                
24 Cf. Leibniz (1989: 119f.) versus I 519-23. However, du Châtelet innovates by distin-
guishing between active and passive dead forces, which Leibniz never did (I 528). 
25 Significantly, du Châtelet does not discuss inverse-square orbits in general, viz. conic-
section trajectories, as Newton had done. This too militates against calling her science 
Newtonian; see below.  
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This condition is sine qua non for Newtonian science properly so-
called, because the kinematic facts of her Chapter 15 can, and had been, 
explained also from non-Newtonian principles in competition with New-
ton’s science. In particular, Leibniz in 1689 had modelled elliptical orbits 
(around the Sun) from contact pressure by an oscillating vortex. Huygens 
in 1690 had elaborated a contact-action theory of terrestrial gravity, with 
Discours de la cause de la pesanteur. And, he had matched Newton’s pre-
diction of the Earth’s flattening at the poles, which, however, Huygens ex-
plained from action by contact, not from gravity at a distance.26  
More generally, as of 1740 ether-vortex theories of planetary and ter-
restrial gravity were still being worked out, as sophisticated updates to the 
Descartes-Leibniz-Huygens alternative to Newton.27 Thus, if we juxtapose 
du Châtelet’s empirical account of gravity effects with her denial of action 
at a distance (and concomitant support for ether-vortex actions) it turns out 
that Chapter 15 is an alternative to Newton. It is not real Newtonian science.    
Absent structure.  So far, I have subverted the received consensus on 
du Châtelet by showing an absence of evidence for it. Now I move to 
strengthen my case: I use absence as evidence. For Institutions to be genu-
ine Newtonian science, it ought to present and endorse the two elements 
that set Newton’s dynamics apart from all competitors: the claim that grav-
ity is a universal interaction exerted from particle to particle; and the novel 
results that his claim entails in Principia. The following results depend on 
Newton’s weaker thesis that, at celestial scales in our system, gravity is an 
                                                
26 Huygens’ causal mechanism was a pressure gradient induced on falling bodies by an 
ether vortex rotating around the Earth’s center; see Huygens (1690: 131).  
27 After Principia came out, Leibniz outlined an alternative account of motion in elliptical 
orbits, with his 1689 Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis. Janiak (2015: 118ff ) explains 
lucidly how Leibniz’s physics in that paper differs from Newton’s. As to the Earth being 
oblate—not oblong, as some Cartesians then said—Hermann had predicted that too, from 
non-Newtonian principles. So had Huygens, from the assumption that “in the spherical 
space comprising the Earth and the bodies around it up to a great distance, there is a fluid 
matter consisting in very small parts diversely agitated in every direction with great speed,” 
which, unable to escape, begins to rotate “in spherical surfaces centered around the center 
of its space,” hence also of the Earth (Huygens 1690: 135). For discussion, see Todhunter 
(1873: 28-63).    
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interaction: the theory of the Moon’s motion under gravity from the Earth 
and the Sun jointly; the theory of the tides; a theory of comets orbiting in 
conic sections around the Sun; a theory of Jupiter and Saturn perturbing 
each other’s orbit by mutual gravity; the theory of the Sun’s motion around 
the common gravity center of the Solar System. Another result (Newton’s 
predicted ratio of the Earth’s bulging) depends on the stronger thesis that 
gravity acts between the particles of bodies.28 However, her book neither 
endorses universal gravity nor treats its specific consequences above.  
My second piece of evidence is from lack of relevant structure. Suppose 
that Institutions were a presentation of Newton’s dynamics. Then we should 
expect it to match his argument structure, which is as follows. 1. A kine-
matics of one particle in central-acceleration fields. 2. The gravitational dy-
namics of two free particles in a vacuum. 3. A theory of spherical bodies 
moving under gravity in a viscous medium resisting as the first or second 
power of the body’s speed. 4. An application of these results to the orbits 
of planets and satellites in the solar system, culminating in an inductive 
inference to universal gravity, followed by a set of predicted effects that 
would further confirm Newton’s theory.  
That is not at all the expository structure of du Châtelet’s physics. For 
instance, nothing in Institutions corresponds to parts (2), (3) and (4) above. 
In reality, the order of her empirical theory mirrors Wolff’s presentation in 
his compendium, while covering a narrower range of topics.29 The impli-
cation of these facts is that her physics is not Newtonian in any useful way. 
It is not even “Newtonian in its basic mechanical principles,” as some 
thought (Iltis 1977: 31). The received consensus appears untenable.   
                                                
28 Separately, Newton, Huygens, and Hermann had not just inferred to equatorial bulging, 
but had also given numerical predictions for its amount—as a ratio of two earth radii, to 
the North Pole and the equator, respectively. Newton’s predicted ratio was 229/230, while 
Huygens’ was 577/578. These values differed because they worked from different assump-
tions about the source of terrestrial gravity: Huygens from ether action by contact, and 
Newton from action at a distance acting from particle to particle.  
29 Cf. Wolff, Elementa matheseos (E II, 1-330).  
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Orthogonal senses.  Lastly, the category ‘Newtonian’ has two more 
contextual senses pertinent to natural philosophy, which was a field broader 
than mere mechanics: 
 
xi.  The right mathematics for physics is the geometry of fluxions.  
xii.  Light consists in an emission of special particles.  
 
We can dispatch these two senses quickly. Institutions does not contain a 
philosophy of mathematics (to which sense (xi) speaks) and so, that brand 
of Newtonianism is irrelevant here. Further, du Châtelet did have an op-
tics—to which sense (xii) would be relevant—but she expounded it else-
where, not in Institutions.30 
 
4.  Conclusions 
I have argued that the physique of Institutions is not Newtonian in any useful 
sense. Its core is a heavily kinematic theory of 1-particle motion, which du 
Châtelet found in Galileo, Torricelli, and Huygens. In light of these facts, 
the ruling scholarly consensus—that she gave Leibnizian foundations for 
Newtonian science—is untenable.  
That consensus is being challenged on other fronts as well. Elsewhere, 
I have argued against its other half, viz. that du Châtelet gave us a Leibnizian 
foundation for science. Recently, a better-argued account of her founda-
tional project has emerged (Brading 2019). Du Châtelet really aimed to 
solve certain related problems in the fundamental physics of her time, irre-
spective of its authorship. Specifically, she aimed to elucidate the nature of 
bodies, the mechanism of the causal actions they exert, and the epistemic 
constraints on theory-building in physics. She did not think that Newton 
alone was worth foundational attention; nor that he had displaced all phys-
ical doctrines that preceded him.  
                                                
30 Gessell 2019 analyzes her theory of optics, and connects it to her views from Institutions.  
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